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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent Chinese engagement in Africa has been on the focal point of a heated debate not 
only within the academia but also in the public dialogue as it has paid generous attention by 
the international media outlets sometimes in the wrong direction, though. This paper is aiming 
at shed a light on the factors which led to the contemporary Sino-African approach. More 
specifically, this will take place by analyzing the today's Chinese foreign policy towards Sub-
Saharan Africa by taking into account not only the apparent and highly debated material 
forces but also the underlying ideational ones. This study strongly demonstrates the view that 
Sino-African relations in order to be studied thoroughly should incorporate both concepts. 
 
Keywords: China, Sub-Saharan Africa, foreign policy, (neo-)realism, constructivism, 
economic interests, power, norms, identities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
China's increasing economic and political involvement on the African continent is a 
demonstration of the remarkable shift in country’s foreign policy over the past two decades. 
In particular, nowadays Chinese engagement in Africa takes place in a multifaceted form and 
it ranges in fields such as burgeoning trade and investment by Chinese State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) which is financed by China's policy banks, official provision of 
development assistance and recently, peacekeeping operations by Chinese forces participating 
under United Nations (UN) framework to be some of the prominent. High level ministerial 
meetings both bilateral and multilateral (under the framework of The Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC)) set the stage and give impetus to the Sino-African approach which is 
labelled by both parts as a win-win situation. 
For Africa's part, Chinese involvement is arguably the most momentous development on 
the continent since the end of the Cold War. 1 During that ideological period despite the fact 
that China's role in the continent was by no means insignificant compared with Soviet let 
alone Western one. Alden argues that 'the end of the Cold War and since the mid-1990s, the 
emergence of China as a significant political force in Africa has instigated a transformation in 
the continent's traditional international relations orientation'.2  For much of the past thirty 
years Africa has been considered as a developmental failure plagued by bad governance, 
economic decline (macroeconomic instabilities, resource curse), acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), environmental degradation and conflict.3 Since lately, China's engagement 
with Africa has turned the attention of scholar community (among others), and watchers are 
debating the nature and scope about the Chinese motives in the region.  
Alden has attempted to illustrate the nature of the Chinese deepening presence in Africa as 
well as to predict potential outcomes of this. He proposes a typology which is divided into 
three contrary views which perceive China as:4 
1. 'Development partner', namely, China's involvement in Africa is part of a long-term 
strategic commitment to transmit its development experience to the continent and a desire to 
build effective cooperative partnerships across the developing world. 
                                                 
1 Carmody, P. and Taylor, I. (2010). 'Flexigemony and Force in China's Resource Diplomacy in  Africa: Sudan 
and Zambia Compared'. Geopolitics15 (2010), p. 499 
2 Alden, C., Large, D. and Soares De Oliveira, R. (2008). 'China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a 
continent Embrace'.  London: HURST Publishers Ltd, p. 353-4 
3 Carmody, P. (2010). 'Globalisation in Africa: Recolonization or Renaissance?' London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc, p. 1  
4 Alden, C. (2007). 'China in Africa'. London:  Zed Books Ltd, p. 7 
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2. 'Economic competitor' this interpretation holds that China is engaged in a short-term 
'resource grab' which, like some Western counterparts, takes little account of local needs 
and concerns, whether developmental or with respect to issues like human rights. 
3. 'Coloniser' which emphasises that China's new engagement in Africa is part of a 'long-
term' strategy aimed at displacing the traditional Western orientation of the continent by 
forging relationships with African elites under the rubric of south-south solidarity. 
 
 1.1 Problem Area 
Drawing upon the second and third typology, it can be clearly assumed that Chinese 
recent involvement in Africa is driven by materialistic incentives such as geo-economic 
interests, predominantly objecting to exploit the rich in natural resources and raw materials 
African territories. At the same time China competes with the West over the control them as 
well as of the African markets. Despite the fact that the relevance of the abovementioned 
observations is not negligible, on the contrary, it should not be underestimated the factor 
which perceives the China in Africa as a development partner. Actually, China has long-
lasting historical ties African countries for more than fifty years. These are based on their 
mutual memories on colonialism and mutual beliefs as developing regions. Chinese 
leadership often stresses these common features between both entities; 'China is the biggest 
developing country and Africa, the country with the largest number of developing countries'  
showing in this way its solidarity and its willingness to cooperate with Africa in order to 
achieve prosperity and development. Consequently when we focus on today's Sino African 
relations we have to take into account both the material and ideational factors.  
Broadly stated, the overall ambition of this study is to make an attempt to analyse today's 
Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. More specifically, the aim is to understand the 
dynamics and developments of Chinese presence in the continent. The empirical focus intends 
to give an overview of Chinese foreign policy and its current interests in Africa as well as the 
evaluation on to what extent Chinese foreign policy is driven material and ideational forces. 
Therefore the final goal of that paper is to give an answer to the following overarching 
research question: 
 How can the material and ideational forces explain today's Chinese foreign policy in Africa? 
 
In Chapter Two the methodological part will try to explain 'how we are going to answer the 
research question'. Chapter Three presents the theoretical perspectives which will guide us 
throughout the project. Chapter Four is devoted to a brief view on Chinese Foreign Policy 
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principles, norms and goals. The next Chapter gives a thorough historical overview of Sino-
African relations from 1949 until today. Chapters Six and Seven as the core empirical parts of 
that study highlight the main material and ideational forces which encompass today's Sino-
African engagement. Finally, the current paper is closing by drawing conclusions and 
outlining the potential future perspectives of Chinese presence in the continent. 
 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodological pathways and tools which 
ground on that paper. In the first place, the methodological framework starts by establishing 
the main working questions, which are derived from the research question. Later on, it is 
presented the case study and the time frame of our research. Afterwards, it will take place the 
description of the origin of the empirical evidence as well as of the types of data which certify 
and consolidate the empirical hypotheses. This chapter will be followed by the introduction of 
the chosen theoretical considerations which will accompany the analytical part. Lastly, the 
current chapter will close with the methodological limitations and some clarifications.  
 
2.1 Working Questions 
In order to answer the research question in a rational way, it is essential to deal it into 
smaller working questions. The paper will address these queries separately in different 
chapters. In the end, the conclusion will try to give answer to each of those questions by 
providing simultaneously an elucidation to the fundamental research question. The working 
questions which have been established and direct us to the empirical part of are the following: 
i. How have the Sino-African relations have been developed? 
ii. Which part of the Chinese foreign policy is guided by material forces? 
iii. How the ideational content of Sino-African relations can be explained? 
 
2.2 Case study and time frame 
This work focus on illustrating the Chinese engagement in Sub-Saharan African 
countries,5 therefore we take into granted that when we are referring to Africa we mean the 
Sub-Saharan African states. We follow the definition of "Sub-Saharan Africa" as used in UN 
                                                 
5 Algeria, Egypt, Western Sahara, Libya, Morocco, Tynisia,  are excluded. 
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Statistics Division.6 We incorporate in our empirical attention Sudan and South Sudan despite 
the fact that under UN's categorisation both belong to Northern Africa.  
That paper aims at outlining the contemporary Sino-African relations taking into account 
the most recent empirical work. Nonetheless in order to understand the changing dynamics in 
China's approach to Africa, it is necessary to place it in the context of Chinese foreign policy 
from the inception of the Communist Party government in 1949 to the rediscovery of Africa 
in the contemporary period.7  
 
2.3 Data - Empirical Selection 
The empirical attention of that study concentrates on the fields in which Chinese 
engagement is evident and can offer us reflections on how material and ideational forces are 
formed and function. Indicatively, we are going to take into account historical and current  
economic and political factors and considerations which is proven that play a role in the 
configuration of the  Sino-African relations today.  
Much of the content analysis comes from official Chinese documents like the ''White 
Paper on China's African Policy'', the ''White paper on China's peaceful development'' as well 
as official credentials from the FOCAC meetings. There is also consulted secondary 
qualitative literature from journals, textbooks and fieldwork research reports all based on 
scientifically correct empirical evidence. These empirical material is straightforwardly related 
with the context of Chinese engagement to Africa as well as with the Chinese Foreign Policy. 
Apart from academic works there is used empirical quantitative and qualitative evidence from 
reports and surveys conducted by OECD agencies, and African Development Bank (AfDB). 
All the abovementioned material is written in English-language, including the official 
documents.  
 
2.4 Theory Selection 
The study will use a social constructivist and rationalist approach in order to understand and 
make sense of the stated empirical problem. We will follow the examination of both strengths 
and weaknesses of each theoretical perspective regarding the Chinese foreign policy toward 
Africa.  
We assume that the rationalist approach is useful because it considers that material forces  
(such as power and economic interests) play a major role in the configuration of the 
                                                 
6 Statistics Division United Nations http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm (Retrieved 
25/04/2012) 
7 Alden, C. (2007). 'China in Africa'. London:  Zed Books Ltd, p. 9 
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international system and as a result the recent Sino-African engagement. Furthermore, in the 
theoretical part will be presented the main agreements and disagreements within rational 
perspectives, namely between neo-realism and neo-liberalism in order to have a thorough 
image about the rationalist point of view. On the other hand, constructivism spotlights the 
importance of ideational forces like norms, identities, values and belief systems as a crucial 
variables for the comprehension of relations between international actors. From this 
perspective, different perceptions of the nature of international relations strongly impact on 
policy decisions of decision-makers.  
 We strongly believe that each theoretical concept alone is inadequate for a comprehensive 
understanding of China’s strategy in Africa today. Each of these theoretical schools captures 
different aspects of reality and identifies different causal mechanisms to be crucial.  While 
sometimes they are considered as competing approaches, these different theoretical 
perspectives supplement each other. Therefore, we deduce that only a combination of material 
and ideational factors can deepen our understanding of China’s behaviour toward Africa.  
 
2.5 Delineations and Limitations 
Discussing about the Chinese engagement in Africa has its limitations, as when we are 
talking about both China and Africa we are required to generalise. Africa is not a homogenous 
continent, as different historical, cultural, economic and political factors have effect on the 
security situation in each African state a fact which definitely has repercussions in its 
relationship with China. On the other hand, China is not a monolithic entity as it is presented 
by many sides. In a globalising world, China's foreign economic policies are put into practice 
by an increasingly diverse set of actors under pressure from a wide variety of interest groups 
and constituency demands.8 However, if we were to summarise what Chinese foreign policy 
is, we might it connect it to the key domestic concern of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), namely ''promoting China's economic development while maintaining political and 
economic stability''.9  
As far as the theory selection is concerned, we have chosen two main International 
Political Economy/International Relations theories the rational theory mainly expressed by 
Neo-Realism and Constructivism. We selected those two theoretical perspectives instead of 
more contemporary Global Political Economy theories, because we deem that despite the fact 
that the demarcation line between markets and states on foreign policy decision making 
especially nowadays is obscure, in final analysis the states will have the last word.  
                                                 
8 Taylor, I. (2009). 'China's New Role in Africa'. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 3 
9 ibid 
 10 
It is worthy to mention that despite the fact that focus of that study is in Sub-Saharan 
Africa some data in Chapter regarding trade and energy incorporate African countries on the 
whole. Last but not least, it should be acknowledged that a serious limitation is the use of 
exclusively English language sources.                                
 
2.6 Research Design 
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Ideational Forces Material Forces 
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Today 
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Conclusions 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In that chapter will be established and discussed the main theories and concepts used in 
the analysis of that paper. The setting and the discussion of the theories is of vital importance 
as they constitute the basis under which the analytical part will be unfolded. There are used 
two theoretical concepts which both can contribute in order to reach accurate assumptions, the 
rationalist approach and the social constructivism perspective, whereas we approach and 
define the terms of foreign policy and aid which will be also used during the analysis. 
3.1 Defining and Analysing Foreign Policy 
The word "policy" is defined as "prudence or wisdom" in the management of affairs. 
Policy is directly connected with the work of government administration. It helps define goals 
and directs the activities of governments and agencies. 10 According to Britannica 
Encyclopedia, the objectives of foreign policy is to guide the activities and relationships of 
one state in its interactions with other states.11 The essential task of foreign policy is to dictate 
how a country will conduct itself with respect politically, socially, economically and militarily 
regarding other countries. A country's foreign policy, mainly represents the self interest 
strategies of the state and how the state safeguards its national interests and achieve its goals 
within the sphere of international relations. Foreign policy define the goals and activities of 
governments specifically that of foreign ministries when dealing with other countries. Since 
the national interest are of great importance, foreign policies are designed by the government  
build on a high-level decision making process. Foreign policy is handled by foreign ministers, 
ambassadors and the head of government. 
 The national interest of the state can be accomplished through peaceful negotiation and 
cooperation with other states and nations or it can be done through the use of exploitation and 
intimidation. The tool used in foreign policy is diplomacy through which manifestations such 
as war, alliances and international trade are related to.12 The managing of foreign relations 
requires carefully considered policies that are part of the foreign interest and concerns of each 
government.13 Today's foreign policy, is due to the complex level of globalization and 
transnational activities, more or less forced to deal or interact with  non-state actors as well. 14 
                                                 
10 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p. 241.. 
11 Britannica Encyclopedia, Academic Edition http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/213380/foreign-
policy.  (Retrieved 12/5/2012 ) 
12 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/213380/foreign-policy (Retrieved 13/5/2012 ) 
13 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p. 241. 
14 http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-foreign-policy.htm. (Retrieved 12/05/2012) 
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The factor of foreign policy has always been important to history. Historically, foreign 
policy is rooting in ancient times dating back to the plains of the Africa where tribes 
presumably interacted from time to time without engaging in all-out-war. The first recorded 
formal agreements made by ancient political communities can be stated back to 1390 BC, 
along with records of the first quasi-diplomatic activity as far back as 653 BC.15 During the 
medieval era, kings all over Europe gained power by subordinating the barons and defying the 
Emperor and the pope. They became the protectors of state sovereignty against any internal or 
external threats. This creation of kingdoms transformed peasants into the "people" or citizens 
and the king became the supreme authority over all the people in the country.16 This important 
change in political transformation became the beginning of the modern era. The change from 
medieval to modern basically involved the construction of the independent territorial state. 
During this transformation, war became a key international institution for resolving conflicts 
between sovereign states.  
The historical turning point starting with the end of the medieval era and the beginning of 
the modern international system and foreign policy can be defined by the Thirty Years War( 
1618-1648) and the peace of Westphalia that brought an end to it. 17 In 1919, the Treaty of 
Versailles was created as a result of the end of World War I which became an important factor 
in foreign policy and international relations. After the World War I, the League of Nations 
was founded as an intergovernmental organization whose principal mission was to establish 
and maintain world peace. The League of Nations was a forerunner for the United Nations. 
Today, the United Nations channels official claims and foreign policy actions from different 
countries and acts as an international forum for foreign policy.18 
 
3.1.1 Material versus ideational forces 
According to Holsti (1988), traditional scholarship in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
posits that a state derives its foreign policy from an assessment of spatial factors and material 
endowments (or their absence) in conformity with a broader set of societal values.19 Though 
these materialist factors and societal values are surely crucial to setting the parameters of 
                                                 
15 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition,.p 10.  
16 ibid, p 15. 
17 ibid, 16-17. 
18  http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-foreign-policy.htm. Retrieved 13/5/12  
19 Found in:  Alden, C. and Alves A., C. (2008) 'History & identity in the construction of China’s Africa policy'. 
Review of African Political Economy 35 (115), p. 44 
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foreign policy choice, this traditionalist approach does not fully account for ideational forces 
such as norms, beliefs and identities to be at the heart of the foreign policy process. 
In fact, it is pretty helpful to emphasize the contrast between a materialist view held by 
rationalists (neo-realists and neo-liberals) and the ideational view held by constructivists. 
According to Tang Kising20 and Alexander Wendt,21 the material world of international 
system is comprised at least by the following dimensions: the geographical environment of 
the state, the total power of the state, the international structure (i.e., the distribution of 
power), the relationship between the state and other states, and the nature of the international 
system. Whereas the ideational world consists of the following: ideologies, culture, beliefs, 
habits, and memories.  
According to the materialistic point of view, power and national interest are the driving 
forces in international politics. Power is ultimately military capability, supported by economic 
and other resources. National interest is the self-regarding desire by states for power, security 
or wealth.22 Power and interest are seen as ‘material’ factors; they are objective entities in the 
sense that because of anarchy states are compelled to be preoccupied with power and interest. 
In this view, ideas matter little; they can be used to rationalize actions dictated by material 
interest. In the ideational view held by social constructivists ideas always matter. ‘The starting 
premise is that the material world is indeterminate and is interpreted within a larger context of 
meaning. 23 
 
3.2 The position of Neo-Realism 
Mainstream IR scholarship ontology today, accepts individualistic and materialist 
conclusions about the states system. It is dominated by Theory of International Politics, 
Kenneth Waltz's powerful statement of 'Neorealism,' which combines a micro-economic 
approach to the international system (individualism) with the Classical Realist emphasis on 
power and interest (materialism).24 
3.2.1 From classical realism to neo-realism 
According to Hans Morgenthau, men and women have a common "will to power".25 
Morgenthau viewed this as being extremely evident in politics and especially international 
                                                 
20 In: Ross, R. and Feng Z. (2008). 'China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics'. 
Cornell University Press. pp. 146-7 
21 Wendt, A. (1999). 'Social Theory of International Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 23 
22 ibid, p. 93 
23 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition,p. 165 
24 Wendt, A. (1999). 'Social Theory of International Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2 
25 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p. 68.  
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politics: "Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, 
power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it 
determine the technique of political action".26 The mind of a realist sees humans as being 
preoccupied with their own well being in their competitive relations with others. They see 
themselves setting in the driver seat with no intention of being taken advantage of. Realists 
aim to have the advantage which is relevant regarding people but also including international 
relations with other countries.  
The approach to realism contains different views of theoretical thoughts. The axiomatic 
conclusions behind this differ on a string of a variety of matters. An aspect that divides 
classical realism and neo-realism lies on the consideration of how states pursue power. For 
classical realists the concept of power is due to the nature of humans. Neo-realists tend to 
emphasize on the concept and pursuit of power which is related to the structure of the 
international system. The concept of power from a classical realist point of view is that it 
leads to the end of things, whereas power from a structural realist perception revolves around 
the definition that power is the means to an end, which evidently is all about survival. 27 
 
3.2.2 Waltzian Neorealism 
According to Waltz, the basic feature of international relations is that there is a 
decentralized structure of anarchy between states. All states are basically the same, everyone 
has to collect taxes and conduct foreign policy. 28  The main difference is in regard to the 
greatly varying capabilities. According to Waltz: ''the structure of a system changes with 
changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units''.29 The explanation is that 
international change occurs because the balance of power shifts accordingly when great 
powers rise and fall. 30 Waltz argues that 'states in order to ensure their survival must 
maximise their power, particularly their military power. Because such power is - zero sum - 
an increase in the military power of one state necessarily producing a decrease in the relative 
power of another - Waltz argued that states are 'defensive positionalists'.  For Waltz the 
struggle of power is an enduring characteristic of international relations and conflict is 
endemic. In such a world, he argued, cooperation between states is at best precarious, at worst 
                                                 
26 Morgentau, H. J. (1965) 'Scienticfic Man versus Power Politics'. Chicago: Phoenix Books.  
27 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p. 85.  
28 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition p. 85.  
29 Waltz, K.N. (1979). 'Theory of International Politics'. New York: McGraw-Hill;Reading: Addison-Wesley. p 
97.  
30Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p. 85.  
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non existence.31 A balance of power between states can absolutely be achieved but the notion 
of war is always a possibility. 32  
There are two types of power related to states- the first one is related to military power, 
and secondly, a covert type of power focused around the socio-economic factors that is 
combined with the establishment of military power. The specific degrees of power (material 
force) is connected to wealth, technology, geographical location, and the size of the state's 
population. In neo-realism, states are different but only in regard to their greatly varying 
capabilities.33  
The theory of neo-realism denies the possibility of social evolution through ideational 
changes.34 Social evolution according to a realist point of view is all about material factors.  
Neo-realists in general do not consider cultural differences to be of any importance, because 
states are considered to react the same way since the ground purpose of their means are the 
same. As mentioned above neo-realists view states to be similar except for some minor details 
concerning power status. This aspect makes it beneficial in terms of analyzing nations, since 
they are all aligned in their search for the same and because they all react the same way. 
Waltz relates to this by saying" National politics consists of differentiated units performing 
specified functions. International politics consists of like units duplicating one another´s 
activities".35 
A main observation by Waltz is the distinction between bipolar and multi-polar systems. 
His notion is that bipolar systems provide a better protection and guarantee to peace and 
security because they are more stable systems than multi-polar. In short, the core of neo-
realism is the idea that no authority is above and beyond the great powers. In an international 
system there is no guarantee that one great power will retain from attacking another, because 
it is in the interest of great powers to be and remain as powerful as possible in order to protect 
itself. Waltz´s main argument is that " the great powers manage the international system".36  
Neo-realism can be divided into two strings the defensive and offensive realism. These 
theories are especially described by John Mearsheimer. When describing the power relations 
between great powers, Mearsheimer uses the analogy of an iron cage because great powers 
                                                 
31 Burchill, S., et al. (2005). ' Theories of International Relations'. 3rd Edition, New York: Palgrave Mcmillan. 
p. 190  
32 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, p. 85. 
33 ibid, p.85 
34 Ross, R. and Feng Z. (2008). 'China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics'. 
Cornell University Press, p. 148 
35 Waltz, K.N. (1979). 'Theory of International Politics'. New York: McGraw-Hill;Reading: Addison-Wesley, p. 
97 
36 Waltz, K.N. (1979). 'Theory of International Politics'. New York: McGraw-Hill;Reading: Addison-Wesley, p. 
195 
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are forced to fight each other for power in order to survive .37  The intention of an offensive 
realism state is to threaten and decrease the security of other's intentionally whereas a 
defensive realism state does not seek security by intentionally diminishing the security of 
other's.38  
3.2.3 Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism 
Neoliberal theory embraces three elements of neo-realism: a) the importance of 
international anarchy in shaping state behaviour, b) the state as the most important actor in 
world politics and c) the assumption of states are essentially self interested.39  
However, the core debate between neo-realists and neoliberals is often characterised as a 
debate between those who think that states are preoccupied with relative gains versus those 
who think that states are more interested in absolute gains. More specifically, the neo-realists 
are sceptical about international cooperation as if states are worried about relative gains they 
will forgo cooperation if they fear that their gains will be less than those accrue to others. 
Neo-liberals on the contrary, deny that relative gains calculations pose such an obstacle to 
international cooperation, in this way, neo-liberals characterise states not as defensive 
personalists, as neo-realists do, but as ''utility maximizers'', as actors that will entertain 
cooperation so long it promises absolute gains in their interests.40  
In spite of these differences, neo-realism and neo-liberalism are both rationalist theories; they 
are both constructed upon the choice-theoretic assumptions of microeconomic theory. 
According to Reus-Smit three such assumptions stand out:41 
 First, political actors such as states are assumed to be atomistic, self-interested and 
rational. Actors are treated as pre social, in the sense that their identities and interests are 
autogenous. In addition, actors are also self-interested, concerned primarily with the pursuit of 
their interests. And they are rational capable of establishing the most effective and efficient 
way to realize their interests within environmental constraints they encounter. 
 Second, actors' interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction. Individuals 
and states are thought enter social relations with their interests already formed. Social 
interaction is not considered an important determinant of interests. 
                                                 
37 Mearsheimer, J., J. (2007) 'Structural realism” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity', 
by Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja and Smith, Steve, Oxford University Press, p.72. 
38  Ross, R. and Feng Z. (2008). 'China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics'. 
Cornell University Press, p. 148 
39 Burchill, S., et al. (2005). ' Theories of International Relations'. 3rd Edition, New York: Palgrave Mcmillan. 
p. 190 
40 ibid, 191-192 
41 ibid, 192-196 
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 Third, and following yet again from the above, society is understood as a strategic realm, 
in which individuals or states come together to pursue their pre-defined interests. Actors are 
not therefore, inherently social they are not products of their social environment, merely 
atomistic rational beings that form social relations to maximize their interests.  
 
3.3 The response of Social Constructivism 
''Realism is essentially a material explanation of political behaviour...Without them( 
i.e.,ideas), you cannot see change in history, and therefore you tend to see international 
politics as a very static game"42. 
 
Despite the dominance of materialist and individualist approaches to international politics, 
there is a long and varied tradition of what might be constructivist thinking on the subject. 
According to Wendt, ''a constructivist overview underlies the classical international theories 
of Grotius, Kant, and Hegel and was briefly dominant in IR between the World Wars in the 
form of what IR scholars now call 'Idealism'.43 In the 1980s ideas from these and other 
lineages were synthesized into three main ideas of constructivist IR theory: a modernist 
stream associated with John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil,44 a post-modernist stream 
associated with Richard Ashley and Rob Walker,45 and a feminist stream associated with 
Spike Peterson and Ann Tincker.46  
The differences among and within these streams are significant, but they share the view 
that rational theoretical perspectives are 'undersocialised' in the sense that they pay 
insufficient attention to the ways in which the actors in world politics are socially 
constructed.47 More specifically, they all agree on 'three core ontological propositions' about 
social life (international system), propositions which they claim illuminate more about world 
politics and than rival rationalist assumptions.  
First, to the extent that structures can shape the behaviour and identities of social and 
individual actors (states), constructivists hold that ideational structures are as important as 
material structures. In contrast to neo-realists that emphasise the material structure of the 
balance of power and Marxists stress the material structure of the capitalist world economy. 48  
                                                 
42  From the Tang Shiping text, pp.8 : Kalevi J.Holsti, quoted in Adam Jones," Interview with Kal Holsti" in 
review of International Studies 28, pp. 619-633, at pp. 629-630, 2002.  
43 Wendt, A. (1999). 'Social Theory of International Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2-3 
44 Ruggie (1983a, b), Kratochwil (1989) 
45  Ashley (1984, 1987), R. Walker (1987, 1993) 
46 Peterson, ed. (1992), Tickner (1993). 
47 Wendt, A. (1999). 'Social Theory of International Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 2-3 
48 Burchill, S., et al. (2005). ' Theories of International Relations'. 3rd Edition, New York: Palgrave Mcmillan. 
p. 196 
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Second, constructivists argue that understanding how non-material structures condition 
actors' identities is important because identities inform interests and in turn, actions. 
Constructivists also argue that understanding how actors develop their interests is crucial for 
explaining a wide range that rationalists ignore or misunderstand. To explain interest 
formation, constructivists focus on the social identities of individuals or states. As Wendt has 
quoted, 'identities are the basis of interests'.49 
Third, constructivists conceive social structures - for instance institutions, multilateral or 
bilateral relations between states - as mutually constituted through reciprocal interaction 
where within them, its members define their interests and identities.50 In other words, as Reus-
Smit conceives that 'as  a realm that generates actors as knowledgeable social and political 
agents, the realm that makes them who they are'.51 
In fact, the revival of constructivist thinking about international politics was accelerated 
by the end of the Cold War, which caught scholars on all sides off guard but left orthodoxies 
looking particularly exposed. Mainstream IR theory simply had difficulty explaining systemic 
changes like the end of the Cold War, or structural change, like the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism. It seem that these difficulties stemmed from IR's materialist and individualist 
orientation, such that a more ideational and holistic view of international politics might do 
better. 52  
 Constructivism was introduced to IR by Nicholas Onuf (1989) who coined the term. It 
gathered a larger following among scholars with a series of influential articles and a book by 
Alexander Wendt (1987, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1999).53 Wendt represents the mainstream variant 
of  IR constructivism and he is engaged with a dialogue with rational (neo-utilitarian) 
approach. According to Jackson and Sørensen (2010: 169) 'Wendt’s analysis is systemic; it 
focuses on interaction between states in the international system and disregards the role of 
domestic factors.' According to Wendt 'the two basic tenets of 'constructivism' are: (1) the 
structures of human association are determined mainly by shared ideas rather than material 
forces, and (2)  that the identities and interest of purposive actors are constructed by these 
shared ideas rather than by nature'.54 
                                                 
49 Wendt, A. (1992). ' Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics'. 
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), p. 398 
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52 Wendt, A. (1999). 'Social Theory of International Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3 
53 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010). ' Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches'.: New 
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 Wendt argues that, 'the character of international life is determined by the beliefs and 
expectations that states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social 
rather than material structures. 55 This does not mean that material power and interests are 
unimportant, but rather that their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the 
system, and specifically on which of the 'cultures' of anarchy is dominant.  Wendt suggests 
three major ideal types of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian.56 In the Hobbesian 
culture, states view each other as enemies; the logic of Hobbesian anarchy is ‘war of all 
against all’. States are adversaries and war is endemic because violent conflict way of 
survival. Hobbesian anarchy, according to Wendt, dominated the states system until the 
seventeenth century. In the Lockean culture, states consider each other rivals, but there is also 
restraint; state do not seek to eliminate each other, they recognize the other states’ right to 
exist. Lockean anarchy has become a characteristic of the modern states’ system after the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Finally, in a Kantian culture, states view each other as friends, 
settle disputes peacefully and support each other in the case of threat by a third party.57 A 
Kantian culture has emerged among consolidated liberal democracies since the Second World 
War. 
Constructivism asks questions such as why and how do states change preferences, 
interests and hence behaviour? 
Here lies the concept of socialisation, namely the ‘causal link’ between norms, identities 
and changes in the behaviour of states. This is a key concept of constructivism, which uses 
sociology to offer insights into the social construction and context of international relations. 
The explanatory power of social identities, kinship affiliation and the appropriateness of 
norms are important if one aims to understand and explain the motives and behaviour of 
agents58. Exactly, this focus on social processes, changes and the influence of norms sets 
constructivism apart from other theories of international relations, such as neo-realism which 
sees the preferences of agents as static and based on material incentives. 
John Ruggie59, argues that, 'neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism treat the identities 
and interests of actors as exogenous (of the interaction) and given', in other words, states 
know who they are and what they want before they begin interaction with other states. For 
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59 Ruggie, J. (1998). ' What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge' . International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: 
Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics. p. 862. 
 20 
constructivists, it is the very interaction with others that ‘create and instantiate one structure of 
identities and interests (endogenous) rather than another; structure has no existence or causal 
powers apart from process’. 60According to Rousseau, 'a shared sense of identity can reduce 
and in some cases eliminate perceptions of intergroup threat'. 61 
 
3.3.1 Critique on Social Constructivism 
Critics of social constructivism argue that constructivism loses balance and it is 
problematic in describing global system's structure and evolution. 
Firstly, Tang Shiping supports that ''it tends to overemphasize ideas and deemphasize 
material forces (e.g., power, geography, and technology). As Wendt has put it explicitly 
(1999: 309): 'The most important structures in which states are embedded are made of ideas, 
not material forces'. As a result, social evolution has now become mostly, if not purely, 
ideational: “Ideas all the way down.  Such a position, however, is simply untenable because 
the fact that “material circumstances . . affect the intellectual evolution and policy choices of 
political decision markers is not in dispute''.62 
Secondly, neo-realists are sceptical about the importance that constructivists attach to 
norms, in particular international norms. Such norms surely exist, but they are routinely 
disregarded if that is in the interest of powerful states.63 At the same time, offensive neo-
realists like Mearsheimer are not ready to accept that states can easily become friends due to 
their social interaction. Such a goal may be desirable in principle, but not realizable in 
practice, because the structure of the international system forces states to behave as egoists. 
Anarchy, offensive capabilities, and uncertain intentions combine to leave states with little 
choice but to compete aggressively with each other. For realists, by trying to infuse states with 
communitarian norms is a hopeless cause.64 
A final critique comes from Tang Shiping who argues: 'whereas neorealists like Waltz 
emphasize only selection at the level of state survival and deemphasize (social) learning, 
constructivism now emphasizes social learning (especially positive learning) and 
deemphasizes selection, both at the level of learning and at the level of state survival. At the 
learning level, constructivism emphasizes positive learning, while neglecting the fact that 
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learning is essentially an evolutionary process in which selection through negative learning 
plays a fundamental role'.65 
 
4. SETTING THE STAGE 
4.1 Chinese Foreign Policy throughout history 
Prior to the modern era, China was the regional hegemon with a proud history of imperial 
dominance. China termed itself the ‘middle kingdom’ (zhong guo) and its emperor was the 
‘son of heaven’ (tian zi).66 China since the ancient times has been closely guided with the 
values of Confucianism. Unlike Europe, where several sovereign countries with relatively 
equal capabilities were constantly competing for power, China used to be ''world empire'' 
without rivalries in East Asia. China’s political and cultural influences were very strong in 
both the neighbouring countries such as Japan, Korea and Vietnam and on the northern 
nomadic tribesmen the Mongols.67 
 However, Chinese empire underwent a major blow during the 19th century when West and 
Japan controlled a big part of Chinese territory rendering practically China to a protectorate.  
At the receiving end of colonial aggression by Japanese and Western powers, both of whom 
‘inferior barbarians’ in Chinese cosmology, gave Beijing an ambiguous attitude of 'admiration 
and indignation' towards Japan and the West.68 This sense of injustice suffered by the Chinese 
people, termed the ‘Century of Humiliation’, is still the dominant factor that propels Beijing’s 
foreign relations. 
 Based on the above reasoning, Chinese history and Confucianism values of a harmonious 
world (hexie shijie)  have been adopted to China's foreign policy perspective.69 This concept 
is conceived as providing one of the sources for the reconstruction of the present Chinese 
national identity, which will rejuvenate the Chinese nation.70 Since the early 20th century, 
Chinese elites (both nationalist leaders like Sun Yet-sen and communist leaders such as Mao 
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin) have repeatedly urged for the “rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation. Yan Xuetong, director of the Center for International Studies at Qinhau 
                                                 
65 Ross, R. and Feng Z. (2008). 'China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics'. 
Cornell University Press, p. 145 
66 Womack, B.(1991). 'Contemporary Chinese politics in historical perspective'. Cambridge University Press,p. 
209 
67 Zhang, T. (2004) 'Self-Identity Construction of the Present China', Comparative Strategy, No. 23, pp. 283-4 
68 Womack, B.(1991). 'Contemporary Chinese politics in historical perspective'. Cambridge University Press,p. 
209 
69 Dellios, R., (2009) 'China’s harmonious world (hexie shijie) policy perspective: How Confucian 
values are entering international society'- Invited paper presented at the 2560th anniversary 
conference and the fourth congress of International Confucian Association (ICA), p. 2 
70 Zhang, T. (2004) 'Self-Identity Construction of the Present China', Comparative Strategy, No. 23, p. 284 
 22 
University, identified two rationales for the Chinese elites to assert this rejuvenation. “First, 
the Chinese regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than 
obtaining something new. Second, the Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration of 
fairness rather than as gaining advantages over others.71 
This rejuvenation of China has become more evident than ever during the last three decades. 
The economic reforms of the post-Maoist era (after 1978) under the pragmatic leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping have paid handsome dividends to the country.72 In fact Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has grew more than 9 per cent on annual basis since early 1980s placing China 
as the world's second biggest economy leaving third its traditional competitor Japan. This 
high economic growth allows more resources available for military modernization (one of the 
four modernizations envisaged by former premier Zhou Enlai early in 1975), and the Chinese 
military is steadily growing stronger now.73 
Graph: Chinese GDP Growth rate from 1990 
 
Source: OECD (2012) 
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Under all these changes, China’s role in the present world is re-conceived and its national 
identity reconstructed by Chinese leaders and their intellectual followers into the following 
four faces: China as a socialist country with Chinese characteristics, as a sovereign state in the 
strict Westphalian sense, as a developing country in the globalization era, and as a potential 
responsible world power on the international arena.74 Nevertheless, it is quite surprising the 
fact that China denies unequivocally to be characterised as a superpower, even today being 
the second world economic power.  
 
4.2 Foreign Policy Today: The White paper 
The Information Office of the State Council, China's cabinet, on  September 2011 
published a document, called ''the White paper on China's peaceful development''.75 It is the 
most recent official document which illustrates in general terms the aims and strategies that 
China will pursue so as to achieve its developmental goals. The White Paper declares that, 
foreign policy plays a central role so as China to manage its targets. Not accidentally the 
biggest part of this document is devoted in presenting and outlining the prospective foreign 
policy that China will follow so as to reach its goals.    
According to the White Paper 'the overall goal of China's pursuit of peaceful development 
is to achieve modernization and common prosperity for its people'.76 China in order to fulfil 
its goal has adopted and implemented since 1970s a three-step strategy for achieving 
modernization. 'The first step was to double the Gross National Product (GNP) of 1980, the 
second step was to redouble the output of 1980 and achieve initial prosperity by the end of the 
20th century, both targets have been met. The third step aims to make the per capita GNP 
reach the level of that of the medium-developed countries, by 2049 the 100th year anniversary 
of CPC. The central goal of this three-step development strategy is to improve people's 
material and cultural lives, and make the people rich and the country strong'.77 It is evident 
that Chinese objectives are based on a strong material basis, being driven by its active 
participation in global economy, and subsequently it could be surmised that China's foreign 
policy will be adhered to a materialist pathway. Actually, Chinese model is based on high 
growth rates of its economy, which in order to be sustained, China has to ensure its energy 
supply security and sustainability as well as the price and non-price competitiveness of its 
enterprises and output. 
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The White Paper refers that Chinese strategy has been guided by the philosophy of 
peaceful rise (heping juequi) and it has as a current task and long-term objective to build a 
harmonious world. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has declared that the country's ascent 
in the international hierarchy would not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand 
in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country'.78 Its foreign policy is 
accompanied with values such as peace, common development and prosperity, equality, self-
respect, trust and coordination to be some of them. According to White Paper, ''politically, all 
the countries in the world, whether big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal 
members of the international community and should receive due respect of the international 
community'', whereas,  in terms of security, ''use or threat of military force should be 
avoided''.79 In this way, we can argue that Chinese worldview is demonstrated by Kantian 
values.   
 
4.3 The principle of non-interference 
Clearly stated, Chinese foreign policy is paying distinctive attention on respect of 
sovereignty among states, apparently being influenced by its semi-colonial experience by 
Western powers and Japan during 19th and early 20th century. It is quite astonishing that the 
White Paper even from its first page by making a special reference to the “Century of 
Humiliation” (bainian guochi), the period from the beginning of the first Opium War in 1839 
to the prevalence of the CPC in the Chinese civil war in 1949. During this time China’s 
effective territorial control shrank by a third, its millennia-old imperial system collapsed, and 
the country was riven by internal uprisings, invasion, and civil war.80 That specific historic 
period seems to exert a substantial impact on China's self-image and simultaneously on the 
way it is conceiving the outside world until our days.  
Therefore, it is no coincidence that Chinese foreign policy has been strictly guided with 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (see in the next chapter). Actually, China's 
principle of 'non - interference' on sovereignty of other states is a cornerstone of China's 
conception of statecraft and international relations as a whole.81 It is frequently stressed in 
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discourses of Chinese officials and it takes a prominent place in the policy documents.82 
Undoubtedly, the principle is informed by China’s own desire that other countries should not 
interfere in its internal affairs, for instance human rights treatment in its autonomous regions 
of Tibet and Xingjian Uyghur. The principle is historically rooted in China’s experience of 
humiliation by Western powers in the 19th century and was thus established as a main pillar, 
when Beijing built up its foreign policy. The principle of non-interference continues to be an 
important element of the self-image of China when is projecting to the outside world and it is 
part of its concept of creating a ‘harmonious world’. 
 
 
5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SINO-AFRICAN 
RELATIONS 
 
Many view China in Africa as a latecomer, however, it is not true. Actually, the China-
Africa contacts have a long history behind it, even though from the official Chinese side are 
stressed and exaggerated showing eternal continuity. According to Alden and Alves, 
throughout history and up to 1949, ''China-Africa contacts may thus be said to have been 
more a result of transnational trade flows with other merchant civilizations, namely the Arabs 
and Persians, and later a side effect of the international framework than a specific Chinese 
foreign policy endeavor''.83 Nevertheless Chinese and Africans had direct interaction which 
can be dated back to the early 15th century China was under Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644). 
That period, the stupendous fleet of emperor Zhang He (1405 - 1433) accomplished naval 
expeditions in Eastern Africa (Kenya and Somalia) which did not have any exploitative or 
colonial context against Africans.84 For this reason, when the People’s Republic of China was 
established in 1949, not only did China had no negative record on the African continent but it 
also benefited from an important leverage due to a common past under the hardship of 
western imperialism.85 Since then, though the official rhetoric of continuity speaks otherwise, 
the fact is that from the opening of official ties with the first African countries during mid-
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1950s, China's engagement with Africa has been episodic, shifting from periods of intense 
activities in the 1960s and early 1970s to outright neglect for much of the 1980s.86  
 
5.1 The Maoist Era 
The Chinese state as we know it today was founded in 1949, when Chinese civil war was 
over (1927-1949) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) managed to capture the control of 
the mainland from the Chinese Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (KMT). China’s policy towards 
Africa under Mao Zedong's leadership was ideologically motivated, providing support for 
national liberation movements as well as direct state-to-state aid, most noticeably for 
Tanzania.87 Furthermore, China’s foreign policy aimed at winning recognition as the sole 
voice of China, the ''One-China-policy'', directed against Taiwan. The battle for diplomatic 
recognition between Beijing and Taipei has been a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy 
since the declaration of the PPC in 1949.88 
After Mao Zedong's ascend in power, Beijing was isolated from the international scene 
and mainly saw its relations with African governments as a means to expand its political 
influence. Moscow under Khrushchev, had severed ties with Beijing, while Washington did 
not recognise China (until 1979) and had an embargo against the country.89  As a result, 
Africa in the Cold War was seen primarily by Chinese leaders as a terrain of ideological 
competition with the Soviet Union and the United States as well as the remaining European 
influences.90 Generally, Beijing’s ambitions in Africa were defined by Cold War politics 
based on zero-sum competition. 
The first official approach between China and Africa took place in 1955 with the occasion 
of the Asian–African Conference in Bandung which became the seminal platform of the Non-
Alignment Movement (NAM).91 The 29 countries92 represented in the Conference showed 
their concerns about the tension between US and China, whereas they collectively opposed to 
the colonialism, especially French influence in North Africa, was another important topic of 
the conference.93 Nasser's Egypt was the first African country which established official 
diplomatic ties with China in 1956.  
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During late 1960s, the decolonisation process of Africa had largely completed and the 
newly independent states became members of UN. 94 Chinese officials recognized that, with 
their numerical advantage in the UN General Assembly and anti-colonial perspective, African 
states held the key to removing the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) from its official 
status as occupant of the coveted permanent seat on the UN Security Council.95 Indeed, 
African states were instrumental to Beijing's strategy of voting the Republic of China out of 
the permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 1971. China secured the UN seat with the 
support of 26 African states (34 per cent of General Assembly votes). By 1976, 39 states had 
recognised the government in Beijing and only eight continued to maintain diplomatic ties 
with Taipei.96 Today, four African countries still recognise Taiwan instead of China, these are 
Burkina Faso, Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe and Swaziland.97 
The early period of Sino-African interaction was based on ''the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-Existence'' which had been already introduced by then Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1954 
during negotiations with India over the Tibet issue. The Five principles are:98 
i. mutual respect for sovereignty and  territorial integrity 
ii. mutual non-aggression 
iii. non-interference in each other´s internal affairs 
iv. equality and mutual benefit 
v. peaceful co-existence  
Development assistance was a major tool of China's foreign policy toward Africa during 
1960s and 1970s. Zhou Enlai during his tour in ten African countries in 1963-4 put forward 
the 'eight principles for China’s aid to foreign countries' a framework which was the 
backbone (together with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) of Chinese foreign 
policy towards the Africa during that period. These are the following99:  
a. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit 
in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral aims but as 
something mutual. 
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 b. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the 
sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any 
privileges. 
 c. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends 
the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient 
countries as far as possible. 
 d. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make 
the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road 
of self-reliance and independent economic development. 
 e. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which 
require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may 
increase their income and accumulate capital. 
 f. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own 
manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the 
Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese 
Government undertakes to replace them. 
 g. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the 
personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.  
h. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have 
the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not 
allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. 
The first African recipients of  Chinese aid were socialist regimes which took power in 
Ghana, Mali and Guinea in 1960, something which was reflecting ideological interests.100 The 
most sensational outcome of Chinese development assistance in Africa was the construction 
of TAZARA railway which linked Zambia's Copperbelt with the Indian Ocean's coastal port 
Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. During that period, Tanzania under Julius Nyerere a great admirer 
of Mao’s collectivisation strategies, belonged to non-alignment movement and thus was one 
of the closest allies of China. The construction completed in 1975, having had a major 
political significance as it broke the economic dependency of Zambia (ex North Rhodesia) 
from white-ruled - under Ian Smith  -Rhodesia (today known as Zimbabwe).101 It is worthy to 
note that by the mid 1970s, China had a greater number of aid projects in Africa than did the 
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United States.102 Nonetheless, that development lost momentum during 1980s when the 
socialist picked up modernization program under Deng Xiaoping. 
 
5.2 A Decade of Neglect (1979-1989) 
China’s endeavours in Africa during the Cold war were limited by what it had to offer in 
material terms as it was still a developing state and lacking proven successful expertise. Its 
technical and economic assistance, though valuable, could not compete with the US or the 
Soviet Union, which was the determining factor for failing to get influence over the continent 
in the long run.103 With the demise of Mao and the advent of economic reforms initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping, this enterprise was postponed for at least more than one decade. 
After 1978, Chinese foreign policy was largely influenced by 'the Four Modernizations' 
which required massive foreign investment and technology. African states were unable to 
contribute to Beijing's internal reforms, due to its failure to open up to the international 
economy and its marginal role in global affairs. Though remaining friendly to Africa, China 
focused on improving trade links with the US, Western Europe and Japan.104 Africa's failure 
to develop its economies efficiently and open up to the international market militated against 
Chinese policy aims, and the increasing extraneous role the continent played in global (read: 
superpower) geopolitics resulted in a halt to closer Chinese involvement. Essentially, Beijing 
not only viewed Africa as largely immaterial in its quest for modernisation but also saw the 
rationale behind its support for anti-Soviet elements in the continent was no longer valid.105 
More limited Chinese engagement in Africa during the 1980s reflected the reorientation of 
Chinese aid in Africa during the 1980s when its political philanthropy developed into more 
commercially oriented involvement.106  
That shift became apparent during Premier Zhao Ziyang’s Africa tour to 11 countries in 
1982-83. That visit aimed at launching a new African policy framed by China’s new 
developmental priorities and global interests. Zhao reaffirmed China’s support for African 
liberation struggles, the consolidation of African political independence, South-South co-
operation and third world unity.107 But the changes brought by the new Africa policy were 
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summarised in the ‘Four Principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation’, 
announced by the Chinese Premier in Tanzania at the end of this tour. This statement differed 
substantially from the ‘Eight Principles for Economic and Technical Cooperation’ announced 
by Zhou Enlai in its 1963/64 Africa tour, diverging from the Cold War ideological 
framework.108 
 
5.3 The Post Tiananmen revival 
Despite the decade of neglect in their relations during 1980s. Sino-African approach 
gained impetus anew during the early 1990s. According to Ian Taylor, an event and two 
processes - one within Africa and the other within China - came together to stimulate the 
current closer involvement of Chinese actors in Africa.109  
First, the events of June 4, 1989 in and around Tiananmen Square meant that Beijing 
underwent a major re-evaluation of its foreign policy toward the developing world. 
Tiananmen Square resulted in (an albeit temporary) crisis in China's relations with the West, 
including an arms embargo imposed by the US and the European Union (EU), and persistent 
Western criticism of China’s human rights record.110 Isolation was further bolstered by 
collapse of the Soviet Union which positioned China as the remaining communist power.111 
Therefore, developing world was effectively elevated in Chinese thinking to become a 
cornerstone of Beijing's foreign policy in an effort to build coalitions and shield itself from 
Western criticism.  
As far as the macro-processes are concerned. Firstly, as Africa's economic reform 
programs gained momentum in 1990s, Beijing began to believe that the macroeconomic 
situation in Africa was taking a favourable turn with resultant opportunities for Chinese 
commerce. This analysis was based on the belief that the African countries have adopted a set 
of active measures to push forward the pace of privatisation, opening up international trade 
and reform based on multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. China has sought to take 
advantage of these developments in Africa and has officially encouraged joint ventures and 
economic cooperation at multiple levels.  Additionally, Africa is perceived by both Chinese 
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government and by Chinese companies to be rich in natural resources, particularly in crude 
oil, nonferrous metals and fisheries.112  
  The above then links up with the second macro-process. Through the 1990s world trade 
grew about twice as fast as world output and FDI flows grew twice as fast as trade.113 The 
process of the economy was stimulated by the introduction of new technologies that shrunk 
distances and speeded up transactions. This new framework established economic diplomacy 
as a tool to promote and protect national interests and became an important strategy for 
conducting foreign policy. China began to follow a more liberal economic (under socialist 
characteristics) pathway by introducing reforms experiencing an unprecented economic 
thriving. The economic diplomacy of China started to make its first steps overseas through 
investment and trade by further regional and global engagement. China's status as a 
developing country and its history of exploitation by European powers, together with the fact 
that it does not attach any particular conditions to its financial aid gives it a good reputation 
among the African elites.114 
The new strategy was capped  by a dramatic increase in visits by top leaders to Africa, 
where they explained and marketed the new program of aid and economic cooperation. Three 
Chinese vice-premiers fanned out to visit a total of 18 African countries in 1995. Chinese 
premier Li Peng visited Morocco that year, and the following President Jiang Zemin travelled 
to six African countries, the first time a Chinese president had ever visited Africa.115 
According to Alden the new Sino-African relations from mid 1990s onwards are defined by 
strategic economic interests. This was confirmed during Chinese president Jiang Zemin tour 
of Africa when he presented a Five Points Proposal which established the terms of a new 
relationship with Africa on a non-ideological footing.116 This is emphasized:117 a) reliable 
friendship, b) sovereign equality, c) non-intervention, d) mutually beneficially development 
and e) international cooperation. The trend of high-level visits intensified during 2000s 
showing that Africa is  high on the agenda of Chinese foreign policy. 
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Figure 2: Chinese leaders visits to Africa, 1995-2009 
 
Source: Brautigam (2009) 
 
 
5.4 The Years of FOCAC 
The culmination of Sino-Africa rapprochement during 1990s gave birth to the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was formally founded in 2000. Weping He 
argues that, '' FOCAC from a historical perspective must be seen as a continuation of the spirit 
of the Bandung Conference''.118 However, economic matters have been the strongest 
component of the forum since its establishment. According to its official website, FOCAC is 
part of the spirit of the 21st century to maintain peace, to seek stability and to promote 
development, which is what all countries want. The website states that the Forum is 
established by China and a number of friendly African countries with the main purpose of 
being a mechanism for collective consultation, dialogue and cooperation between the 
developing countries. FOCAC aims to promote cooperation in a wide range of fields: political 
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affairs, peace and stability issues, multilateral cooperation, economic and social 
development.119  
The first High-level Ministerial meeting within FOCAC was held in Beijing in 2000.  
That meeting concerned itself with two major areas: how to promote and establish a just and  
equitable new international order, and how to further strengthen co-operation between China 
and Africa on economic and social development.  Two important policy documents were 
published during that meeting, the Beijing Declaration and the Programme of Cooperation on 
Economic and Social Development.  In 2003 the summit took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
in 2006 the summit once again took place in Beijing the most recent event took place in 
Sharm El Sheik, Egypt in November 2009. 
 
5.4.1 FOCAC High Ministerial meetings of 2006 and 2009 
On the 4th and 5th of November 2006, a Chinese delegation including the government and 
41 Heads of State met in Beijing with 48 African countries to participate in the third FOCAC 
summit meeting.120 In short, the summit was a platform for the enhancing of the South-South 
cooperation and a call for a North-South dialogue and the World Trade Organizations to 
resume the Doha Round of negotiations. A number of commitments were made during the 
summit in 2006.  The FOCAC III summit in 2006, followed the publication of China’s Africa 
Policy and was used to publicize the Sino–African relationship to the world. One of the major 
results of FOCAC III was a list of eight development pledges to China’s African partners 
including121: 1) the doubling of aid, 2) provision of preferential loans and buyer credits, 3) 
establishment of a development fund, 4)  building of the AU conference centre, 5) debt 
cancellation, 6) unilateral market access, 7) opening of new trade and economic cooperation 
zones and 8) training of African professionals.  
In the same manner FOCAC IV generated eight pledges that resembled the challenges of the 
previous agreements. They include: (1) climate change cooperation; (2) technology transfer; 
(3) a further US$ 10 billion in concessional loans and cancelling of debts; (4) zero-tariff 
treatment for 95 per cent of products from ‘poorer’ countries; (5) further development of 
agricultural cooperation; (6) increased focus on malaria prevention and treatment; (7) 
education through, amongst others, constructing fifty schools and training teachers; and (8) 
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increased collaborative research122. These pledges by no means consist only of aid. They 
combine aid, trade and investment measures, and most are best described in terms of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) concept ‘other official flows’ (OOF), comprising 
funds from governments that do not meet the criteria for ‘official development aid’.123 
Although, it seems that during the Sino-African cooperation under the FOCAC framework the 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) from China to Africa between 2001 and 2009 
presents a significant almost fourfold increase from $303 million to $1390 million, but still it 
can't be compared with US or European ODA which for 2007 were around $5 billion and $12 
billion respectively.124 
 
Figure 3: China's annual African aid disbursments 
 
Source: Brautigam (2009) 
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6. MATERIAL FORCES BEHIND CHINESE ENGAGEMENT 
China's tremendous economic growth has as immediate effect the growing need for 
natural resources and raw materials.125 The Chinese average income level per capita achieved 
a rise over 400 per cent between 1980 and 2000.126 In addition its population has risen and 
will keep on rising, along with the demand for material goods for its output and consumption 
needs. Due to its geology and climate China's domestic production can not cope with this 
increasing demand. This development inevitably has attracted lots of awareness on how able 
China is going to sustain itself. 
Africa's abundant and relatively unexploited natural riches such as energy resources, non-
ferrous minerals and timber as well as agriculture and fisheries offer the Chinese a unique 
opportunity to lock in through formal or informal means a steady supply of key resources 
serving in this way its economic interests.127 After the start-up of Going-out strategy in early 
2000s the Chinese companies have developed a multidimensional role in African markets. 
Chinese SOEs operate in sectors ranging from natural resources extraction, manufacturing, to 
construction of infrastructure taking at the same time advantage of cheap finance via mainly 
export credits by the Chinese banking system. Last but not least, Chinese development 
assistance seems to be really close related with the ever-increasing Chinese commercial 
interests in the continent.  
 
6.1 Africa and China's Oil Security  
China's exceptionally robust economic growth in 1990s and 2000s has stimulated huge 
upsurge in demand for oil. Between 1995 and 2005, China's oil consumption doubled.128 The 
projections estimate that Chinese demand for oil will increase by 156% between the years 
2001 and 2025.129  It is worthy to mention that China became a net importer of oil products in 
1993130, and net importer of crude oil in 1996131. Thus, Chinese public authorities have 
initiated strategies in order to secure and diversify the oil supply from overseas and as a result 
to lessen the pressure from the escalating oil demand.  
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Figure 4: Growth in Primary Energy Demand (2010-2030) 
  
Source: International Energy Agency (2011) 
Africa owns approximately 8% of the world oil reserves and 11% of the world oil 
production.132 As a result today, Africa for China is set to become a more important source of 
oil, partly as a strategic offset to dependence on the Middle East.133 Indeed, nothing 
symbolised Africa's importance to the Chinese economy so succinctly as Angola becoming 
China's largest foreign supplier of oil, passing Saudi Arabia in 2006. Already in mid 2000s, 
over 31 per cent of all of China's oil requirements are sourced from Africa.134 
Since mid 1990s, Chinese oil companies, initially CNPC, have entered into an array of 
overseas oil investments.135 In Africa, Chinese NOCs made their first appearance in 1996, 
when CNPC purchased a 40% stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company in 
Sudan136. Since then, CNPC has started operations in 5 African countries137 whereas all 
Chinese NOCs (Sinopec and CNOOC the other two major ones) have been involved in 
various deals with the majority of the nineteen African countries that produce oil or have 
confirmed oil reserves.138  
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6.2 Sino-African Trade  
Of the wide range of Chinese activities in Africa, the incremental Sino-African trade 
transactions provide the most powerful evidence of China’s emerging economic interests in 
the continent. The three major sections in the Sino-African economic relationship are: China's 
drive for resources especially oil but also minerals and food; new export markets for its 
products; and new investment opportunities for its companies.139  
 Trade between China and Africa began to accelerate from 2000. In fact, bilateral trade 
surged from $11.58 billion at the end of 2000 to $93.6bn in 2009.140 At the start of last 
decade,  China only represented the 4,1 per cent of Africa's trade but at the end of 2009 its 
trade with Africa had more than tripled to nearly 14%.141 This happened at the expense of the 
two dominant world trade powers the EU and the US. Both saw theirs share on bilateral trade 
with African countries between 2000 and 2009 to shrink from 53,5 to 44,5 per cent for EU 
and from 16,1 to 13,1 per cent for the US.142 
Figure 5: Sino-African Trade (1995-2009) 
 
Source: World Trade Atlas 
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6.2.1 Chinese Imports from Africa 
Fossil fuels and raw materials represent roughly the 4/5 of Chinese imports originating 
from Africa. According to Carmody, from 2000 to 2003, China accounted for the vast bulk of 
increased global demand for aluminium (76 pct.), steel (95 pct.), nickel (99 pct.) and copper 
(100 pct.)'. At the same time Africa holds ''42% of the world's share of bauxite, 38% of its 
uranium; 42% of the world's reserves of gold; 73% of its platinum; 88% of diamonds. The 
continent also has enormous reserves of non-ferrous metals, like chromite (44%), manganese 
(82%), vanadium (95%) and cobalt (55%). 143 
The table below, shows that 10 African countries takes up 76% of all trade relations with 
China. Angola is China's major trading partner with 21% of the entire market of the Sino-
African trade.  It shows that 50% of the trade relations with these 10 countries is based on 
natural resources specifically oil exports to China whereas the other 27% is related to 
manufactured goods and the 2% agriculture.   
  
Figure: China´s top 10 African trading partners between 2006 - 2010 
 
Source: Yong (2011)144 
 
From the same table, it is getting clear that the lion share of the Sino-African trade relations is 
built upon China's demand for natural resources which is fuelled by Chinese economic growth 
and its deep concern for energy security. Overall, five oil and mineral exporting countries 
account for 85% of Africa's exports to China.145  
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6.2.2 Chinese exports to Africa 
The main Chinese exports to Africa are manufactured goods (such as electronics, textiles and 
apparels) and machinery and transport equipment. Together, they comprise the 90,3 per cent 
of  China's exports to Africa.146  Manufactured exports to Africa consist of either intermediate 
inputs for products assembled in Africa and shipped to third markets (US-EU), or capital 
goods (machinery-equipment) destined for African manufacturing sectors; some are non-
durables, which compete with domestic manufactures in Africa.147 As China's economy has 
taken off, the search for more and more markets for Chinese exports has intensified. Africa is 
seen as a useful and profitable destination, and Chinese imports into Africa - mostly low-cost 
and low-quality goods-have taken over the marketplaces in most African countries, as any 
visitor will attest.148 This development creates a big problem for African economies and 
output as cheap Chinese goods which have overwhelmed African markets compete directly 
and in many cases in unequal terms with the domestic ones.    
 
6.3 The Drivers and Instruments of Chinese Economic Engagement 
As we underlined in the previous Chapter,  Chinese in their economic engagement with 
the African countries combine aid, trade and investment. China's prolonged period of high 
growth rates which is based primarily on its export capacity has resulted in accumulating 
large trade surpluses with most of its trade partners.  These trade surpluses are reflected in 
massive Foreign Exchange Reserves which according to the Chinese Central Bank were 
estimated in approximately $3,3 trillion in March 2012.149 This is another reason why it is 
considered as an important investment partner by many African countries. The burgeoning 
Foreign Exchange Reserves enables Beijing to offer African countries concessional loans and 
other preferential credits.150 
Furthermore the Chinese Forex Reserves are used for the financing the Chinese SOEs 
wishing to operate overseas participating in Going out strategy. The China Eximbank 
occupies a central role in Beijing's engagement with African governments China's strategy of 
'going global'. It was established in 1994 as government owned institution whose principal 
activities are to support the expansion of Chinese business by providing financial export credit 
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and international loans for overseas construction and investment, and offering official lines of 
credit.151 
The Chinese government has established eleven Trade Promotion Centres around the 
continent and Chinese are actively encouraged to see Africa as trade and investment 
destination.  Over 800 Chinese companies are doing business in 49 African countries with 480 
involved in joint ventures with African firms.152 Except for the energy resources which 
undoubtedly are the most important focus of Chinese involvement in the continent, there are 
other forms of resource-based commercial engagement with Africa play an important part in 
shaping trade and investment ties, among these commercial logging in Equatorial Guinea and 
Liberia, cotton and sisal plantation agriculture in Tanzania, the rehabilitation of transport 
infrastructure in Botswana, new investments in textile manufacturing in Zambia and Kenya 
and the installation of sophisticated telecommunication systems in Djibouti, Namimbia and 
Sierra Leone.153 
Linked to these investments are projects aimed at improving the physical infrastructure of 
these countries especially road and port facilities, which enhance the attractiveness of Chinese 
ventures to African governments as well as improving the export efficiency of these 
enterprises. Chinese companies have often successfully outbid their Western or Southern 
counterparts,154 through the traditional strategies of linking investment to tie in projects and 
providing lower labour costs in the form of less costly managerial staff and by introducing 
their own contract workers. Some of these ventures are promoted and managed by not only 
high profile Chinese multinationals but also by small and medium enterprises. 155 
 
 
6.4 Chinese Development Assistance 
Foreign aid policy comprises one of the fundamental instruments of Chinese foreign 
policy toward Africa. Chinese aid policy goals are set by its political leaders. In particular 
there are two institutions which are responsible for the aid distribution the Ministry of 
Commerce and the China Eximbank. Brautigam argues that China gives aid to Africans for 
three reasons:156 
a) strategic diplomacy, 
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b) commercial benefit  
c) as a reflection of society's ideologies and values. 
 An important difference between the Chinese and Western aid is that societal interest 
groups such as NGOs play a minor role in shaping China's role. Whereas private and semi 
private commercial interests are a growing factor in the determination of Chinese assistance 
particularly at the provincial levels. However, in China state interests (political, commercial 
and bureaucratic) overwhelming the societal influence on aid.157 Western donors for a long 
time perceived the African state as an obstacle to socio-economic development, often 
circumventing it and its elites by channelling aid through NGOs. This sharply contrasts with 
the state-centred concepts of  Chinese who, unlike Western countries, agree to finance 
grandiose and prestigious buildings that African leaders highly appreciate for their own 
political reasons. This kind of grandiose projects as well as infrastructure projects are 
regarded as out of fashion among the Western donor community, which is preoccupied with 
the reduction of poverty.158    
Chinese development assistance primarily takes the form of development projects, as they 
are perceived to produce quick and tangible results. Likewise, we know that while Chinese 
development assistance is intended for both productive and social sectors, the majority of the 
assistance is channelled into infrastructure projects including roads, power plants and 
telecommunications. 159 Since most infrastructure projects are public sector works, China 
conceives its investments as goodwill projects to woo the sympathies of African state leaders. 
This enables China to gain political influence, which often open the doors for commercially or 
strategically more attractive business in other sectors, for example to win tenders for oil and 
mining concessions.160  
 
6.4.1 Non-interference  and ( usually ) no strings attached. 
 According to Brautigam, 'China does not claim to know what Africa must do to develop. 
China has argued that it was wrong to impose political and economic conditionality in 
exchange for aid, and that countries should be free to find their own pathway out of 
poverty'.161 However, Jakobson and Knox argue that, 'Chinese aid is not unconditional' as 
some may believe. Support by the recipient country for China’s ''One China'' position ruling 
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out Taiwan’s independence is a near absolute requirement to receive aid. Thus, aid provision 
is an important factor in China’s ability to limit Taiwan’s formal and even informal 
relationships around the world'.162 Kragelund comes to confirm the aforementioned 
observation as ''we do know that countries that exchange diplomatic ties with Taiwan for 
China can expect to be rewarded with large increases in development assistance''.163  It is also 
common from Chinese side to link grants or concessional loans to resource deals by major 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)'.164  
 
6.4.2 Tied Chinese Aid 
The use of Chinese firms and Chinese-sourced materials, has been a consistent component 
fact of China's aid programme. Here lies a criticism against Chinese development assistance 
offered to African countries in form of investment and loan packages. Which means  that they 
often stipulate that contracts be awarded to Chinese companies. Since Chinese aid often 
comes in the form of loans and grants leverage to insist on such provisions is robust.165   
Prestige projects such as aid buildings and stadiums, have also played an important part in 
securing agreements with the African governments. Examples of this include the construction 
of an extension to the building housing parliament in Uganda, new offices for the ministries 
of foreign affairs in Angola and Mozambique, presidential palaces in Harare and Kinshasa, 
and stadiums in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic. This form of symbolic 
diplomacy has great appeal to African elites who welcome the opportunity to replace colonial 
era public buildings, as well as being a vivid demonstration of Chinese largesse.166  
Another reason that Chinese aid is welcomed by African leaders is the fact that the focus 
on building infrastructure has been largely ignored by Western donors in recent years. 
According to a Western diplomat ''China is able to build a railway before the World Bank 
would get round to make a cost-benefit analysis.167 Undoubtedly, Chinese willingness is 
highly appreciated by African leaders. Lastly , Chinese companies with aid experience in 
Africa have an important advantage in securing contracts over other engineering companies in 
                                                 
162 Jakobson, L. & Knox, D. (2010). ' New Foreign Policy Actors in China'. Stockholm: SIPRI Policy Paper 26, 
p.10 
163 Kragelund, P. (2011). 'Back to BASICs? The Rejuvenation of Non-traditional Donors’ Development 
Cooperation with Africa' Development and Change, 42 (2), p. 598 
164 Jakobson, L. & Knox, D. (2010). ' New Foreign Policy Actors in China'. Stockholm: SIPRI Policy Paper 26, 
p.11 
165 Taylor, I. (2009). 'China's New Role in Africa'. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.22 
166 Alden, C. (2007). 'China in Africa'. Zed Books Ltd. p. 23 
167 Taylor, I. (2009). 'China's New Role in Africa'. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 22 
 43 
that they are prepared to undertake projects at a very low tenders as a means to ensure future 
contracts.168   
 
 
 6.5 Angola: Competing with the West 
A good example of Chinese pragmatic engagement with Africa is Angola. Angola being 
an oil producer and OPEC member which after decades of civil war, rapid post-conflict 
reconstruction became the government’s priority in the early 2000s. As a result, it began to 
seek partners in the international community that could help to make this happen. At the end 
of the war the IMF and many Western donors wanted Angola to adopt a staff-monitored 
programme (SMP) demonstrating good performance against certain criteria (transparency 
with oil revenues, tax reforms, trade liberalisation etc.) that would lend credibility to Angola’s 
economic policies and open the way for a donor conference to raise funds for national 
reconstruction today seems willing either to fill the gap of Western donors and IFIs or even 
challenge them.169  
 The Angolan government taking advantage of the high international oil prices refused to 
come into terms with the conditionalities and announced in 2003 that they no longer sought to 
conclude an agreement with the IMF. 170  It was in this context that China sought to offer 
Angola a $2bn oil-backed infrastructure loan (which guarantees China a supply of 10,000 
barrels per day) with far fewer conditionalities (tied loan one of them) and a preferential 
interest rate at 1.5 percent. 171 In this manner, Angola succeeded in starting its urgent need for 
reconstructing its infrastructure.  At the same time, China managed to ensure an alternative 
source of energy resources which is necessary for fuelling its economic growth, as well as its 
construction companies took advantage undertaking a big part of the infrastructure projects.  
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7. IDEATIONAL FORCES BEHIND SINO-AFRICAN 
RELATIONS 
Materialist point of view argues that China's engagement in Africa can be attributed to 
economic and commercial interests or balance of power on the global level. On the contrary, 
there is also an alternative notion supporting that Chinese foreign policy toward Africa is 
dictated by ideational forces such as mutual identities, beliefs and norms which have been 
formed historically resulting from the more than fifty years interaction between the two 
entities. As constructivists argue that system of shared ideas beliefs and values also have 
structural characteristics that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action. 
According to Alden 'the emphasis on self-interest mingled with shared experiences and 
developmental aims is seen to be the common project that encapsulates the rationale for a 
renewed engagement between China and Africa.172  
'Nowadays Sino-African relations have as a point of convergence shared values and norms 
such as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, mutual development and benefit all 
them under the framework of 'south-south cooperation'. Nevertheless, there are occasions in 
which China's disposal seems to diverge even slightly from some of the above mentioned 
norms (non-interference principle), something which became evident in case of Darfur during 
2006-2008.   
 
7.1 South-South Cooperation: A Collective identity Construction? 
Historically, China and Africa were used to classify each other as parts of Third World 
during the Cold War under the anti-imperialistic camp of Non-Alignment Movement, whereas 
they share common experiences such as colonialism. Weping He, argues that ''China has 
always regarded Africa as its most reliable ally in the international struggle. China's non-
aligned foreign policy and its national commitment to socialism imply a promise that China 
will stand firmly and support the countries of developing world''.173 Alden and Alves believe 
that ''the use of history by Chinese foreign policy makers is clearly aimed at drawing lines of 
continuity that paper over these shifts and breaks in Africa policy that have been the 
experience of all external powers engaged in Africa. In this context, the evocation of 
solidarity politics is carefully employed to suggest a shared sense of identity as fellow third 
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world states whose interests and outlooks on the prevailing international system have 
remained unaltered over the last 50 years''.174 
Today, under the motto of South-South cooperation, the Chinese leadership has 
established a comprehensive discourse on the principles of its relations with Africa. The 
Chinese government highlights the common grounds and the common interests in Sino-
African relations. According to Hackenesch, ''this discourse aims at creating a common Sino-
African identity in order to plaster differences in bilateral relations with regard to conflicting 
interests or contradictory practice to principles. African countries are designated as 'friends' or 
'brothers', sharing similar historical experiences as both sides have been colonised by Western 
powers. China’s discourse is thus deeply rooted in and often refers to the perceived history 
and long tradition of Sino-African relations – emphasising continuity''. 175 It is becoming 
obvious in the White Paper on China's African Policy issued in 2006, which declares that: 
''sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development—these are the 
principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting 
China-Africa relations''.176  
Chinese often point out that they treat African countries all equal and would not 
differentiate, for instance, between strategically more or less important countries. As far as 
development assistance is concerned, although the amounts might differ, China is providing 
aid to all African countries which have diplomatic relations with China. It also appears to be 
the case that China ‘ensures that visits by senior leaders to Africa include countries that do not 
have natural resources’.177 Even countries like Ethiopia with only limited natural resources, 
have seen their trade with China double from US$ 150 million in 2003 to US$300 million in 
2005.178   According to Beijing, equality in Sino-African relations inevitably results in a 'win-
win situation' for both sides. This stand is embedded in a discourse which posits China not 
only as an appealing alternative to the West, but also as a better choice for Africa.179 
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7.2 State Sovereignty and Positive Learning  
As we saw in Chapter Four, mutual benefit and respect of sovereignty is a repeating 
buzzword used by Chinese in their official documents as well as on their relations with 
African countries. As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao restated, 'in cooperating with Africa, 
China is not looking for selfish gains. We are committed to two principles: equality, benefits 
both ways and the non-interference in internal African affairs''. 180 This is explained by the 
shared history of imperialism and colonialism when both China (during the Century of 
Humiliation) and Africa had suffered at the hands of Western states. Given the increasingly 
ambivalent relations between African countries and the former colonial powers, China makes 
a point of stressing its distinctiveness from Western countries and their policies when 
approaching its African counterparts. 
 What makes the Chinese stance on sovereignty, so particular in regard to Africa is the 
fact  that perhaps nowhere else in the world has state sovereignty been more eroded than on 
that continent.181 This was largely the result of Western-prescribed policies - the notorious 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) - through International Financial Institutions' 
(IFIs)182 in the 1980s and 1990s. According to Kragelund, ''the ‘adjustment era’ of the 1980s 
drastically changed the aid relationship between the donors and recipients''.183 By tying 
development assistance to (macro)economic and political (good governance) reform, Western 
donors sought to impose or support structural change in Africa's aid-dependent countries. 
Although not consistently carried out, the imposition of economic and political 
conditionalities progressively undermined the sovereignty of African states and put their 
governments under considerable stress. 184  
Nowadays, Chinese are taking seriously into account African nations' sensitivity into 
sovereignty issues and they follow a different from the Western strategy when they engage 
with development assistance initiatives in Africa. In particular, they combine the 
aforementioned foreign policy norms with their positive learning from their developmental 
experience the years of modernisation since late 1970s. More specifically, they are adopting 
the example of Japanese resource-backed development loans in China, with which Chinese 
boosted initially their economy by getting new infrastructure and technology from Japan 
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repaying it with shipments of oil and coal.185 The same takes place today in many parts of  
Africa with natural riches (see Angola case, in previous chapter) where Chinese benefit from 
African raw materials and resources but at the same time Africans are taking advantage of 
infrastructure and production capacity building, both vital assets for their modernisation and 
future prosperity. Hence, the Chinese involvement in development assistance initiatives in 
Africa can be seen as the manifestation of a win-win game.  
 
7.3 Darfur: A Normative Change? 
The excluded and sanctioned by international community - due to North-South civil war 
(1983- 2005) - Sudanese regime has been one of the most intimate economic partners of 
China in Africa over the last two decades. Sudan is providing 60 per cent of its oil output to 
the Chinese market,186 being China's third largest trade partner in the continent after South 
Africa and Angola in 2005. While, Chinese oil company CNPC has invested billions of 
dollars in the downstream and upstream oil sector of the country. Problematically, the vast 
majority of Sudan's oil  is found in the Upper Nile (which today is part of the newly 
independent South Sudan) where the largely non-Muslim Dinka and Nuer people live.187 Oil 
has thus been an integral part of the long-standing dispute between the Arabic north 
represented by the official Khartoum government under Omar al-Basir and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement / Army (SPLA/M) based in Yuba currently capital city of Southern 
Sudan.  
According to Taylor, certainly Khartoum has used hard currency generated by Chinese 
investment in Sudanese oil fields to finance conflict in the southern part of the country.188 The 
same applies for Darfur conflict which led to a serious humanitarian crisis where more than 
200,000 people killed across the area, and at least 2.2 million others forced to flee their 
homes, since local rebel groups began fighting Sudanese government forces and allied 
Janjaweed militia in 2003.189 The Darfur atrocities caused substantial damage to China’s 
international reputation, due to Beijing's stance - as late as 2005 - to hamper and undermine 
the efforts for a resolution to the crisis by abstaining consistently from UN Security Council 
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meetings.190 Initially, China was following its well-established foreign policy principle of 
non-interference (also typical with its engagement with the African countries) 
underestimating the conflict and the political risk.191 However, in the case of Darfur became 
evident the contradiction of Chinese double identity as a developing country and a great 
power. Steinvig argues that China was in front a dilemma between identities, economic 
pursuits and social acceptance.192  
China from 2006 onwards started undertaking a more active role for finding a solution in 
the Darfur issue. In fact, Beijing welcomed and supported the Darfur Peace Agreement of 
May 2006. According to Daniel Large, ''more involved diplomacy was first evident in behind 
the scenes encounters, as when President al-Bashir attended the FOCAC meeting in Beijing in 
November of the same year. Most notably, this was seen later in November 2006 when the 
Chinese Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya helped to broker a compromise deal in Addis 
Ababa on the ''Annan plan'' calling for an expanded UN-African Union (AU)  peacekeeping 
role in Darfur.193 Wang Guangya after the peacekeeping agreement declared: ''Usually China 
doesn't send messages, but this time they did. It was a strong message that the proposal from 
Kofi Annan is a good one and Sudan has to accept it''.194 Similarly, President Hu Jintao stated 
to its Sudanese counterpart in February 2007, that ''Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to 
resolve this problem''195Undoubtedly, these facts demonstrate the Chinese government’s 
gradual move away from its principle of non-interference. 
 This behavioural change of China toward Sudan and the international community has 
different explanations. China’s identity as a developing country in an African context means 
that it is very receptive to the social influence and signals coming from the group of African 
countries. Actually, most African countries which during 2004 shared the same views with 
China on Darfur issue started change their position in 2006 as the conflict worsened and the 
reputation of the AU and the safety of the AU-led African Mission to Sudan (AMIS) were 
placed in jeopardy by Khartoum’s unwillingness to cooperate.196 Changes in the perception of 
its African partners on how the conflict should be solved may consequently also have had a 
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decisive effect on China's taking into account the fact that Beijing could no longer justify 
rejecting Western criticism of its reluctance to put pressure on Sudan.197 The shift in Chinese 
stance can be also explained by the anti-Chinese campaign in the West linking Chinese 
support to Khartoum regime with 2008 Beijing Olympics referring to them as ''Genocide 
Olympics''.198 In fact, that campaign was supported by Hollywood celebrities and it had also 
broad coverage by media something which definitely had a negative impact on Chinese image 
internationally. 
   
8. CONCLUSION 
 
Before, sum it all up, let us first recall the research question: How can the material and 
ideational forces explain today's Chinese foreign policy in Africa? 
In the first place, the material forces are definitely an apparent driving factor behind the 
contemporary burgeoning Chinese engagement with Africa. In particular, Chinese tremendous 
economic growth has spurred a dramatic increase in its demand for natural resources such as 
conventional fuels and non-ferrous minerals. As a result Africa a region rich in natural 
resources is fitting perfectly to China's needs. This trend is reflected in the approximately 
tenfold rise in Sino-African trade during the previous decade of 2000s where minerals 
dominate the bilateral trade transactions. Furthermore, Africa is regarded as an ideal 
destination for investment by Chinese large and middle-sized SOEs. In fact, Chinese firms 
have an ever-increasing presence in the region, investing in sectors ranging from construction 
and agriculture to telecommunications and textiles to name a few. Actually Chinese promote 
the extroversion of their companies far from China in order to find new export markets 
something which in many cases has negative impact on domestic African production and 
export sector. Not accidentally then-South African president Thabo Mbeki declared in 2006, 
''China cannot just come here and dig for raw materials and then go away and sell us 
manufactured goods''.199 
 As far as Chinese foreign policy is concerned, strategic considerations instigated a more 
active and globally-oriented foreign policy and, by extension, the search of allies, primarily in 
the southern hemisphere, on whom Beijing could rely in the pursuit of its national and 
international interests. From the African side, Beijing's rising political and economic interests 
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provide African countries with a rare opportunity to lessen their dependency on Western 
states and donor organizations by allowing them to diversify their relations with the outside 
world.  The need to expand and strengthen China's bilateral relations with Sub-Saharan Africa 
was part of this strategy. 200  
The establishment of FOCAC, as a Chinese initiative in 2000 is deemed by some as a 
vehicle with which China tries to launch its multifarious political and economic strategies on 
the continent.  However, FOCAC is considered by both China and the African states as a 
political platform that ensures and consolidates South-South cooperation under the spirit of 
''win-win cooperation''. Chinese leadership's generous promises toward its African 
counterparts during 2006 FOCAC meeting, concerning aid, trade, debt relief, developing 
African infrastructure and production capacity seem to be all on track.201  
As Alden acknowledges, ''China is indeed Africa's partner and, in many ways, the 
continent's most enduring one. From the outset of establishment of CPC to the present day, 
the Chinese government has pursued a foreign policy that has conformed to the interests and 
needs of Africans to a greater degree than any other country''.202 There are ideational factors 
operating as part of what is styled 'win-win cooperation'. According to Tull, ''politically, since 
helping China gain admission to the UN, African states have supported China (including in 
the years following 1989) in different multilateral settings''. 203 China in turn styles itself as 
leader of the global South and champion of a progressive 'new international political and 
economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit' and 'safeguarding 
legitimate rights and interests of developing countries'. Efforts to work with and speak for 
Africa as part of the global South are intertwined in China's emerging role in international 
affairs.204 
Finally, as we argued in the previous chapters both material and ideational forces play a vital 
role in defining the Chinese engagement to Africa. Definitely we should not overestimate one 
factor against the another.  
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9. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
 
China's presence in Africa undoubtedly has room for further expansion both in economic 
and political fields. As long as, the dynamism of Chinese economy continues on today's pace  
there is no doubt that the already well-entrenched economic bilateral ties will be upgraded, 
challenging straightforwardly the Western economic interests in the region on the mid-term.  
However, politically the following no-strings-attached policy by Chinese potentially will be 
confronted with serious challenges in the future. Especially, if we consider the fact that most 
African states seem to abstain from reforms toward good governance and human rights 
respect. Hence, it is more than certain that China will receive tight pressure from the 
international community (similar with the case in Darfur) to undertake a more constructive 
role in order African elites to be complied with the international standards. This possible 
development will challenge anew the Chinese foreign policy principles testing its capacity on 
what extent wants to be a responsible stakeholder in the continent. 
 As we saw in Chapter Seven, Chinese leadership portrays itself, at least to African audiences, 
as a developing nation in order to underline the convergence of interests between China, 'the 
biggest developing country and Africa, the country with the largest number of developing 
countries' at the same time as stressing its attachment to 'South-South- solidarity'.  However, 
simultaneously China is the second biggest world economy currently and according to IMF's 
Euromonitor report before 2020 is going to surpass US and to be the largest economic 
power.205 According to Hackenesch, ''today, as China is developing from a regional to a 
global power and international expectations vis-à-vis China’s international responsibility are 
growing, the principle of non-interference is de facto coming under visible strain. In addition, 
with increasing Chinese investments in Africa, the necessity to protect investors – and 
Chinese citizens in partner countries – equally increases''. 206 
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